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In the Supre:me Court 
of the State of Utah 
HORACE F. TAYLOR, doing 
business as 
TAYLOR MOTOR SERVICE 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
KENNETH B. MURRAY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
vs. 






Appeal from the Disbict Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Utah. in and for the County of Cache. 
Hon. Lewis Jones, Judge. 
F 1 L E D GEO. D. PRESTON 
n~C 1 & 1950 205 Cache Valley Bank Bldg. 
u- ................ Logan, Utah 
----------------------c.~~~~-Utah Attorney for Respondents. 
Clerk, Supreme 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HORACE F. TAYLOR, doing 
business as 
TAYLOR MOTOR SERVICE 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
KENNETH B. MURRAY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
vs. 






The respondents do not agree with appellant's brief, 
and desire to controvert the same and state wherein said 
brief is inconsistent with the facts. 
1. There was never a completed contract between 
Stuart and Murray; nor was there ever a meeting 
of the minds thereon. 
2. Murray never took the Stuart certificate of title 
to the Hudson for Stuart to complete prior to 
November 9th, nor while in the employ of Taylor. 
Nor did he ever take the certificate to Stuart for 
the purpose of completing the same for his own 
behalf. On the contrary he obtained Stuart's 
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2 
signature thereon as an agent of Taylor, at Tay-
lor's request and for the purpose of returning the 
same to Taylor. 
4. Taylor did not interfere with dealings between 
~1urray and Stuart; nor did he cause a breach of 
contract between them; and in fact there never 
was such a contract. Any default by Murray to 
Lockhart Finance Co. was caused by Murray's 
own misconduct and failure. 
5. Murray knew of the demands of the Finance 
Company, and voluntarily placed the Packard in 
storage, and failed and refused and neglected to 
bring the delinquencies up to date. Taylor did 
not retain the proceeds of re-sale, but applied 
them on the amount he had repaid to the Finance 
Company upon Murray's default. 
6. Neither Taylor or Stuart admit by pleadings or 
otherwise that there was ever a contract between 
Murray and Stuart. 
7. There is no stipulation between counsel that the 
only question was fraud, nor that the verdict of 
the jury would control the liability of the parties. 
Nor did the Court disregard the verdict of the 
jury. 
8. Conclusions to be drawn from appellant's state-
ment of facts lead to error, and the statement 
when considered as a whole is inconsistent with 
the facts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(For convenience, the parties are referred to by their 
surnames.) When Murray went to the beet field to make 
a deal with Stuart, he had previously been trying to sell 
1/u 
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a new Packard, '50 model to Stuart ( Tr. 57). As a matter 
of fact Muray said to Stuart: "I said to Mr. Stuart that 
this car was a 1950 Packard," and he further told Stuart 
that although it was registered with the State of Utah as 
a 1949, that the same could be changed to a 1950, through 
a "little red tape." (Tr. 85.) No such change of registra-
tion could have been n1ade once it was registered. (Tr. 
152-3-4). There is good reason why stuart wanted a '50 
model, for it is common knowledge that there is a vast 
difference in trade value, and in fact original value of cars 
of different year models; in this case there was about 
$400.00 difference in '49 and '50 Packards and on the 
witness stand :Murray was handed the National Automo-
bile Dealers Association ( N. A. D. A.) book and refused 
to read to the jury the values placed therein. Tr. 101-2) 
And when asked to give the jury the values as shown by 
the book, he said: .. 1 won't." (Tr. 102). 
iVIurray himself did not believe that he had concluded 
a contract because the title to the 1941 Hudson was turned 
in to Taylor and not Murray (Tr. 51) a'nd on November 
11th Murray was sent by Taylor over to Stuart's to get 
Stuart to sign the certificate of title on the Hudson. This, 
Murray did even after being discharged ( Tr. 68). Murray 
never offered or tendered to Stuart the '49 Packard (Tr. 
123 - 170), and did not, himself want to go through with 
the Stuart deal until he was settled with the Finance 
Company, even though he had taken the Hudson to 
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Taylor's. (Tr. 123). He treated the car as his at all times 
and in fact he obtained another buyer for it and asked 
permission of Taylor's auditor to keep it a few more days 
( Tr. 177). And this was between the 11th of November 
and 1st of December. He then did not claim he had made 
any binding deal with Stuart. 
Murray had informed Stuart that the '49 Packard had 
been driven only 1600 miles and when Stuart examined it 
at Taylors on the 9th of November, the reading was found 
to be 2600 miles ( Tr. 157). 
Murray did not accomplish a completed transaction. 
The Hudson was not transferred by Stuart (Tr. 131), nor 
was the Packard ever tendered, or in condition to be 
tendered to Stuart because J\..furray turned it over to the 
Finance Company voluntarily ( Tr. 123). Even though 
the Packard was placed, after re-possession, in Taylor's 
place it was tendered back to Murray by Taylor for 
exactly the same sum as Taylor was required to pay the 
Finance Company, namely $2100.00. This tender Murray 
refused or failed to accept ( Tr. 186). 
The cause of the loss of Murray's Packard to the Fin-
ance Company was not through any fault of Taylor's or 
of Stuart's. He abused the employees of Taylor's (Tr.l79) 
and came to the place of business in an intoxicated con-
dition ( Tr. 191), and in addition to this he received suf-
ficient money in salary and commission to have redeemed 
the delinquent payment. He owned only an $80.00 or 
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$90.00 installment ( Tr. 124), and when he was fired or 
quit he was paid $122.83 by Taylor (Tr. 175) which was 
only for one-third of the month of November. 
~lurray was paid and accepted the regular commis-
sion on the '50 Packard which was sold on the show-room 
floor, and this was after his services were terminated, thus 
indicating that he had not sold his own car, and felt that 
he was entitled to the commission on the new car ( Tr. 
106-7, 174-5-6 & 187). 
Taylor did not impose himself on either Murray or 
Stuart and told both of them to settle their differences 
(Tr. 62,66 and 188), and in pursuance to such instruction 
Murray took the title to the Hudson to Stuart, so Taylor 
could close the deal on the '50 Hudson, and brought the 
Hudson title back to Taylor (Tr. 110-1). 
After Murray had received the commission on the '50 
Packard from Taylor and after he had defaulted on the 
contract with the Finance Company and turned in the '49 
Packard to them, and after Taylor had paid the Finance 
Company $2100.00, and after he had turned over the 
Hudson to Taylor, and after Stuart had taken out the new 
'50 Packard, Murray then changed his mind and finding 
the Hudson standing in front of Taylor's with the keys in 
it, he took possession of the Hudson, and drove it over to 
his home in Wellsville without the knowledge or permis-
sion of Taylor. (Tr. 54 & 92). 
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After Murray had driven his car about 2600 miles and 
had owned it about two months, he he charged Murray 
for his second hand, 1949 Packard, within about $40.00 
of the price which Stuart could have bought the same 
type of 1950 Packard, brand new (Tr. 117-8). 
Taylor and Stuart by their pleadings deny that any 




There was no such stipulation as set forth in appel-
lant's brief, page 7 apd 8, for there the Court said: "So 
we know where we're going, the Court understood it is 
to make findings on all issues not submitted to the jury, 
provided there's evidence to justify such findings" ( Tr. 
200). 
The question of delivery of title to the Hudson, of 
the completed contract, and of general damages, and as 
to many other matters were never submitted to the jury. 
(See the Court's remarks Tr. 207-8). 
Counsel for appellant insists in his brief ( p. 8) that 
Stuart was doing business with Murray. T~is has con-
clusively been determined against appellant by the jury 
(Tr. 31) and the Court in finding No. 7, (Tr. 37) and 
amply supported by the evidence. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
Without ru·guing appellant's brief page by page, suf-
fice it to sa:· that the only manner in which a comprehen-
sive picture of the case can be had is to analyze the testi-
mony as it reflects on the actions and conduct of Murray 
in the Courtroom, and by the evidence. We have here 
an over-reaching and over-zealous salesman who misrepre-
sented to a lifelong friend that he was selling a '50 packard. 
(For a price that is within $40.00 of a new car of the same 
type). The actual difference in value if both '49 and '50 
had been new is about $400.00. Murray justifies this 
practice by stating that he felt he was paying too much 
for the Hudson (Tr. 128) where he said that he gave 
about $150.00 more than the Hudson was worth. 
It is interesting to follow the testimony. of Murray 
on cross examination where an attempt was made over 
many pages of testimony in an effort to get him to tell the 
jury what the ''blue book" (NADA) difference in value is 
between a '49 and '50 Packard. 
"Q. Tell the jury the difference in value in a '49 
and 1950 car. 
A. That's a matter of who is selling it. 
Q. You refuse to tell them that as quoted by the 
books, do you? 
A. You tell them. 
Q. Do you refuse? 
A. You tell them . . . . . . 
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Q. You don't want to tell the jury? 
A. No, I don't" (Tr. 115) 
(And again at Tr. 101) 
"Q. "I want you to tell the jury the difference in 
value to an automobile dealer of a turned-in '50 
car on a repurchase, and you've got it (the 
NADA) right in your hand, and you can give it 
to the jury as easily as not. Will you do it or 
won't you? 
A. I won't." 
He claimed that he had not gained a penny on the 
whole deal, notwithstanding the fact that all of the tran-
sactions were handled through Taylor, and he was draw-
ing a flat salary of $200 per month, plus three per cent 
commission on sales (Tr. 105). He would not admit that 
Taylor had paid him a commission on the 1950 Packard 
even when he had been shown the check which he had 
indorsed and on which was a computation showing three 
percent of the wholesale price of the Packard, less freight 
and taxes (Tr. 106-7). 
Murray alleges in his pleadings and in his brief that 
he was damaged by reason of the misconduct of Taylor 
and Stuart, notwithstanding the fact that the cause of his 
discharge was that he abused the auditor by calling him 
a liar and otherwise causing a commotion in Taylor's place 
of business and entering the place in a drunken condition 
Tr. 179- 191). Not only that, but when he first came 
back from Stuart's, he left the papers in the seat of an old 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
Studebaker, and did not show up for work again for two 
or three days ( Tr. 65). And in addition to this, all the 
while he having drawn $200 per month plus commissions, 
he defaulted on his contract with the Finance Company, 
and this he also blan1es to Taylor and Stuart. It was for 
this sort of conduct that the Court made it finding No. 9 
as follows: 
. . . "while all of the allegations of the answer and 
cotmter-claim and third party complaint, were and 
are untrue and incorrect. In this connection, this 
court further finds that neither Charles P. Stuart nor 
the plaintiff ever breached any contract with the 
defendant Ken Murray, and that said Ken Murray 
has not been damaged in any respect by the acts of 
any of the other parties to this action, but that said 
damages and injuries, if any, sustained by said Ken 
~1urray, were brought about solely by his own mis-
takes and inability to meet his obligations." 
The question of general damages was left strictly to 
the ~ourt and this has been settled by conclusion No. 2, 
"That the defendant is not entitled to judgment against 
either the plaintiff or the third party defendant" ( Tr. 38). 
Also, finding 8 is amply supported from the evidence 
hereinbefore quoted: 
"the court further finds that said Ken ~1urray never 
did leave the title papers for his own Packard car 
with anyone at the plaintiffs garage for delivery to 
Stuart, nor did he ever offer personally to deliver to 
said Stuart the title papers to his own Packard; the 
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most that said Murray ever did in this respect was 
to make it possible for Mr. Stuart to obtain the pos-
sesion of said Packard only, and that said Stuart, 
believing that he was dealing with the plaintiff, and 
never having been tendered the title to Murray's 
Packard, was at liberty to change his mind in his 
dealings with the plaintiff, the said Stuart believing 
all along that he was dealing with the plaintiff 
through Ken Murray as plaintiff's agent, and to select 
another Packard automobile on the floor of the plain-
tiff's showroom, which he did do." 
No part of the above finding had anything to do with 
the question of fraud determined by the jury, and in fact 
the jury made the same finding in answer to interrogatory 
No. 3 ( Tr. 31). This, then concludes the entire case in 
favor of plaintiff and Stuart. 
Counsel complains (on page 15 of his brief) of my 
objection. I ask the Court to consider that my reference 
to the 1949 Packard is either a mistake of the reporter or 
an inadvertance on my part. On page 67, I refer to the 
same matter, and mention the 1950 Packard. All through 
the pleadings and evidence we have claimed that Murray 
represented his car as a '50 Packard. As an example of 
this refer to the question the Court asked Murray: (Tr. 85) 
"Mr. Murray, I'll ask you the nature of the conversa-
tion that you had with Mr. Stuart at the time you 
made this trade in the field that you have just testi-
fied to. Or sale of the Packard car, as to a '49 or '50 
model Paql<ard. A. I said to Mr. Stuart that this car 
was a 1950 Packard." 
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There was then some question which arose as to changing 
the designation after registration with the State, and both 
Taylor and the State Tax Commission representative said 
that this cannot be done, and of course, such is the case. 
The general argument here disposes of each point 
catagorically argued by appellant, but it is important to 
meet the challenge of counsel at the bottom of page 18. 
This is not a matter of failure of consideration. Murray 
claims he had the title to the Hudson, but there is not a 
word in evidence to the effect that he could ever have 
performed had there been a contract with Stuart. In fact 
he voluntarily turned his Packard in as above stated, and 
then said that he did not want to go through with the 
Stuart deal until he had straightened out his affairs with 
the Finance Company (Tr. 123 & 170). As further evi-
dence of this I point to the fact that Murray asked Taylor 
if he could keep the car for a few more days, because he 
had a sale for it (Tr. 177-8) to another party. 
The contention of counsel that certain findings of the 
Court are not within any issue joined, and the contention 
that the verdict of the jury is binding are without merit. 
Appellant pleads that he is the owner of the Hudson. The 
Respondents both generally deny this allegation (Tr. 3, 4, 
6 & 8, 17 & 18). Furthermore, Respondents pleaded as 
follows: (Tr. 7 & 8) 
"That at the time the defendant was still employed 
with the plaintiff and thereupon, as an agent of the 
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plaintiff and in order to deliver the possession of said 
automobile (Hudson) and the certificate of title 
thereto from the said Charles Stewart to this plain-
tiff, but after he had terminated his employment with 
the plaintiff, secured from the said Charles Stewart 
the possession of said Hudson automobile and the 
certificate of title thereto upon the representation 
to the said Charles Stewart that he, the said defend-
ant, would deliver the possession of the said automo-
bile and certificate of title thereto to this plaintiff, 
and that the said defendant did, as a fact, deliver the 
possession thereof to the plaintiff at his place of 
business in Logan, Utah, and deposited the unsigned 
certificate of title with the plaintiff; that shortly after 
such delivery the defendant secured from this plain-
tiff said certificate of title upon the representation 
to this plaintiff that he would secure the signature 
thereon ¢ the said Charles Stewart and deliver the 
same back to this plaintiff, all of which representa-
tions the defendant did not intend to fulfill and, as 
a matter of fact, has never delivered the possession 
of such certificate to this plaintiff and still keeps and 
holds the same against the will and consent of this 
plaintiff. Further answering said paragraph, plain-
tiff alleges that defendant surreptitiously and secretly 
and without the consent of this plaintiff took the 
possession of the said Hudson automobile out of the 
possession of this plaintiff wrongfully, illegally, and 
without any right, title or ownership therein." 
I do not claim to be a master of pleading, but I feel 
certtain that the general denial of ownership of the Hud-
son in defendant, and the above copied matter from the 
pleadings plainly puts in issue every finding of the Court. 
And under Rule 49 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this 
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issue not having been demanded by Counsel to be deter-
mined by the jury was properly before the Court. 
Points B. C. and D. 
All these points are related to the arguments under 
A above, and while here controvertted, it is felt that it 
would take useless time and space to repeat. 
CoNCLUSION 
The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
GEO. D. PRESTON 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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